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Introduction
E
ven though it has been a quarter of a century since Poland undergone
crucial socio-political changes, it is claimed that the process of reach-
ing mature democracy is still unfinished. This is also one of the major
causes of that the Polish media system is under ceaseless construction.
The first period, called by R. Filas (1999, p. 37) as the phase of impetuous
enthusiasm and forced changes, resulted in enacting basic bills and in es-
tablishing plethora of the new media ventures. The most common were lo-
cal newspapers (hundreds), radio stations (dozens) and TV stations (dozen
or so). Media reality very often was ahead of law regulations, especially at
the early stages of transformation. Vital two acts for the press sector were
introduced in March 1990 (8th and 22nd). First one concerned self-govern-
ment authority and opened the new era of the local press in Poland. The
second one began dismantlement of the press monopoly by demolishing
Working-Class Publishing Cooperative (RSW). Although it proceeded
quite fast a distributional part of this institution kept its favourable posi-
tion for the next decade. Symbolic closure of the socialist model of the
press was done when the Seym passed a revolution abolishing the office of
censorship in April 1990.
Electronic part of the media system developed in due course and also
appropriate legislation was introduced later on. The essential bill of radio
and television broadcasting was passed in December 1992. As the article
deals with the topic connected with television, important details about this
law will be given in following paragraphs. Nevertheless, it is worth men-
tioning that regulations in audio-visual media sector were significantly
late in comparison to real life of fast growing market and the audience de-
mands. Suffice it to say that first commercial radio and TV stations started
to operate at the beginning of 1990, which is more than three years before
the abovementioned bill was put into practice.
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Twenty five years of media system development is not a long history
and hardly any could state that what may be observed now is a final shape
of Polish media landscape. Moreover, its former construction, subdued to
the socialist propaganda model, operated almost twice as long as the mar-
ket-driven economy in Poland. Introduction of new legislative regulations
did not cause that the old system has been instantly fully dismantled or
completely replaced by the new one. What has really happened was coex-
istence and kind of a mixture of an old and a new system. Thus, this trans-
formation might be called as a negotiated one (Jakubowicz, 2007).
Since the socialist regime collapse politicians chosen during free elec-
tions a couple of times has been trying to have control over Polish media,
particularly public television. Their influence becomes more visible when
the time of political campaigns is close. Nevertheless, this trend is rather
a matter of elites: whether they have class or not, how strong are the pillars
of democracy and how efficient is the watchdog role played by the fourth
estate. The issue, however, has been discussed lately throughout Cen-
tral-East European countries. On the other hand, when it comes to the pri-
vate sector it is also a question of the ownership and transparency. This
matter was took up by academics and practitioners clustered in European
Journalism Observatory. Media researchers in their joint effort came to
conclusion that the phenomenon of media barons who are thinking of us-
ing their influences to reach particular political goals is noticeable even in
Western Europe (Kuœ, Russ-Mohl, Szynol, 2013).1 The wider research,
namely “Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,” was car-
ried out recently by the University of Oxford.2
Though the aim of this article is focused on the current situation in Pol-
ish television it is more than justified to give the essential background
which shows the direction of the most significant changes connected with
the process of digitalisation of terrestrial television. The character of this
short study is mainly descriptive, nonetheless, as a former journalist au-
thor tries to combine theoretical approach based on documents and litera-
ture analyses with his own experience, observations and interviews with
practitioners.
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1 For a shorter version in German see: M. Kuœ, S. Russ-Mohl, A. Szynol, Die
Rückkehr der Patrons, “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” 13.08.2013, http://www.nzz.ch/
aktuell/feuilleton/medien/die-rueckkehr-der-patrons-1.18131794.
2 Final reports of the project are available at: http://mde.politics.ox.ac.uk/in-
dex.php/home/2-news/179-new-fianl-project-reports-published.
Towards dual, public and private television
As it was mentioned before, radio and television developed later than
the press sector. Firstly, because it is a kind of regularity that more ad-
vanced technologies need more time to be introduced and assimilated.
Secondly, investments in this segment are usually much higher. Thirdly,
law regulations were launched almost three years later than those con-
nected with the printed media. Nevertheless, even in the pre-licensed pe-
riod (the first license process started in 1993 and finished next year)
between 1990 and 1993 more than hundred local radio stations appeared
and dozen or so private local TV stations. Additionally, transformation of
the press was mainly based on privatisation of existing titles, whereas be-
sides two governmental channels TV market had to be built almost from
nothing.
The most important difference, however, was the share of foreign inves-
tors. Polish members of parliament did not set any limitations for foreigners.
It is hard to judge, why it has happened but a couple of explanations are
possible. First of all, the press market seemed to be neglected. Years of ex-
ploitation when it comes to printing machines/houses, offices and news-
rooms resulted in their quite poor condition. Using old technology and
lack of know-how was also very common. Foreign investments were to
cure all these drawbacks. Last but not least, one of the intensions of
de-monopolisation law was to free newsrooms from the communists, es-
pecially at the management and editor-in-chief levels.
As Bajka claims (1998, p. 21), “the Germans approached the issue me-
thodically, trying to determine the press market segments which they
could take in the future.” Their well-known groups, such us: Bauer,
Springer, Burda, Grüner+Jahr flooded Polish market with cheap highly-
-circulated monthlies and weeklies for the youth and women. Surely, the
Germans were not the only ones interested in running media business in
Poland. There were also companies from Norway, Italy, France, Sweden,
Denmark, Switzerland and the United States. Nonetheless, it was not the
colour press and magazines takeover that triggered such critical attitude
towards foreign investors’ presence but their acquisitions in daily press,
particularly at the regional level, which is the core of the author’s interest.
In the second half of nineties German company, Verlagsgruppe Passau,
and Norwegian Orkla gained dominant position in regional daily press in
Poland, which led to pluralised monopoly (Filas, 1991, p. 38). Soon after
Orkla had been taken over by Mecom, the author suggested that: “the Brits
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will consider to withdraw from Poland completely due to the dissimilarity
from other divisions. In the meantime, the Germans will try to take over
Mecom’s shares in the regional press sector, which is Passauer’s core of
interest. If they succeed, the readers will be the biggest loser without
choice of other point of view” (Szynol, 2012, p. 361). In 2013 Mecom sold
out its regional dailies to German group. Consequently, there are only
a few titles left that are run by other companies. The problem of foreign
companies’ presence on the informational part of the media market is be-
ing taken up quite frequently by media researchers. Although there is no
common agreement among Polish scientists in that matter, most of them
recognize advantages and disadvantages. J. Flankowska (2002) tried to
put these prose and cones together in a special issue of “Studia Medio-
znawcze” dedicated to the abovementioned subject.
Going back to the electronic media sector, it is essential to indicate that
its further development differed from the printed one due to the limit of
shares foreign investors could have in radio and television broadcasting
companies. According to the previously mentioned radio and TV broad-
casting act from 29. December 1992, “concession for the joint-venture
company may be granted if foreign investor’s part in seed capital or in
share capital do not exceed 33 per cent” (Ustawa, 1993, art. 35, p. 2). This
rule was valid up until first of May 2004 when Poland accessed European
Union. Thus, one might say that Polish electronic media market was pro-
tected against aggressive expansion from abroad. It is highly probable that
if it were not for these limitations, Polish radio and TV broadcasting
would have been shaped otherwise.
In early nineties, as it was mentioned above, private radio and TV sta-
tions were launched. Some of them, due to lack of law regulations, broad-
casted without any permissions. Others tried to obtain temporary permits
and awaited the first license process. As a result of this process the Na-
tional Broadcasting Council granted in radio sector three nationwide li-
censes (RMF FM, Radio Zet, Radio Maryja), two over-regional and 156
local ones. Naturally, that was a kind of revolution on the Polish radio
broadcasting market and it framed conditions for further competition be-
tween public and private segments. The living proof of it is that nowadays
the first two stations when it comes to audience rates are: RMF FM and
Radio Zet.
For public television years after socio-political breakthrough were
very tough. Firstly, two organisms, which for decades were gathered in
one and governed by the Radio-Television Committee, had to divide. Sec-
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ondly, two channels of Polish TV had been for years perceived as a tool of
socialist propaganda and the main goal was to regain the audience trust.
That is why 18th of November 1989 a TV announcer began with words:
“I hope that the programme will step by step earn your trust. The news in
our new programme will be good or bad, hopefully those later the least but
always true.”
Whereas governmental television had to (be) transform/(transformed)
towards public, competitive – private sector started from scratch. Firstly, at
the end of 1989 and further on local terrestrial stations came into existence,
such as: Sky-Orunia in Gdañsk, PTV Echo in Wroc³aw and TV Morze in
Szczecin. Most of them were broadcasted illegally, nonetheless soon be-
came very popular in their locations as the trust in public TV was still under
construction. Moreover, in the circumstances of free economy, open board-
ers and lack of audiovisual content satellite television was conquering the
market. Aerials sprang up as mushrooms and to some extent their presence
on the balconies were perceived as an expression of social status. Simulta-
neously, also cable TV appeared, though due to necessity of infrastructure
investments the pace of its spread was not so fast. It is worth emphasizing
that from this time on Polish television market was divided in three opera-
tional modes: terrestrial, satellite and cable. The only change is that the ter-
restrial signal has been recently changed from analogue to digital. Another
important thing is the percentage of people using different ways of audiovi-
sual content consumption, which will be discussed in following paragraphs.
Fierce competition
Development of the private sector sharpened competition, absent dur-
ing the communism era. Once Poland chose the path towards democracy,
the government lost its monopolistic position and instrumental abilities in
media. Naturally, it was not those dozen or so local terrestrial TV stations
that might have become a threat to rulings’ power. Furthermore, this pro-
cess of losing control was continuing in time. Establishing a new sector
carried out in two directions. One mode was based on creating a network
of local terrestrial stations, the second – to set up nationwide TV and try to
gain the license.
Soon after dozen or so local broadcasters launched their media busi-
ness, Nicola Grauso appeared. Most of the media market observers claim
that it was nobody else than Silvio Berlusconi, Italian tycoon, who sent his
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Sardinian friend to make business in Poland. Grauso had been taking over
shares in mentioned local stations (up to the restricted limit of 33%) and
started to build the network, namely Polonia1. As T. Mielczarek points
out: “Grauso’s activity aroused many controversies. Magnitude of his in-
vestments was questioned and the quality of Polonia1 programme criti-
cised. It has been emphasized that the television operates against Polish
law – Polonia1 did not receive a nationwide license and none of its stations
concession to broadcast locally. In spite of that the programme was still
broadcasted” (Mielczarek, p. 321).
It is worth stating that popularity of Polonia1 was quite big. For the
first time Polish audience could watch maybe not very ambitious produc-
tions, nonetheless – gathering millions of viewers all over the world, e.g.
“A-Team”, “MacGyver” or Spanish and Argentinian soap operas. It is also
reported that for the first time in Polish TV advertisements started to inter-
rupt films and other programmes. In 1994 Grauso’s stations were shut
down as he had not been given the license. Even though he still tried to op-
erate and broadcasted the signal via satellite. Finally, Grauso sold out his
Polish assets to Italian group Fincast (after its bankruptcy – Polcast). An-
other thing is, how twisted and complicated were fates of local terrestrial
stations, which will be mentioned later on.
The second modus operandi was taken by Polish businessman, Zygmunt
Solorz-¯ak. Fifth of December 1992 he managed to launch a brand new TV
station – Polsat. At the beginning a signal was sent via satellite from the
Netherlands, as there was still no law to spread terrestrial television in Po-
land. This was probably one of the arguments used against Grauso and in fa-
vour of Solorz during the first license process carried on between 1993 and
1994. Knowing that illegal broadcasting might be brought to the table, Pol-
ish entrepreneur did not take the risk to start his business within the country.
Nevertheless, his profile and business background gave raise to contro-
versy. Thanks to his connections with politicians, efficient lobbying and
go-getting energy – it was him, not Nicola Grauso who had been given the
first license to run nationwide terrestrial television.
Talking about making decision in the electronic media sector, it has to
be said a little bit more about the most important act mentioned before.
Twenty ninth of December 1992 the Seym passed a very expected radio
and television broadcasting bill, which took effect on the 1st. of March
next year. Besides setting the limit for foreign companies, this crucial act
began a new era for both sectors: public and private. Due to this document
national (or rather governmental) radio-television was going to transform
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into two independent media companies: Polish Radio (PR) and Polish
Television (TVP), both of which as a stock company of the State Treasury.
However, the key issue in the act was establishing the National Broadcast-
ing Council (NBC).
As M. G³owacki rightly points out, “Poland represents the French
model of appointment where both the legislative and the executive branch
have the power to appoint the members of the regulatory authority. Mem-
bers of the Council are appointed by state bodies which are related to polit-
ical parties. Furthermore, in this case, they can directly represent the
political party’s programme and main elements of that parties ideology.
The French system is closely linked to the political structure and does not
always guarantee a balance of power between the political forces” (G³o-
wacki, 2008, p. 113). Similarly, the NBC is an institution which practically
cannot be unbiased, as its members are nominated by three political bodies:
the president (two members), the Seym (two members) and the Senat (one
member). Even though that in the constitution, where the NBC is also men-
tioned, it is clearly stated that “Amember of the NBC can neither be a mem-
ber of any political party or trade union nor run any public activity which is
impossible to reconcile with the dignity of fulfilled function” (Konstytucja,
1997, rozdz. IX, art. 214, p. 2). In T. Mielczarek’s opinion by establishing
a regulator of audiovisual media in such way “Polish legislator recognised
that this is the best solution for the issue of a public supervision of those me-
dia, which may best protect public interest, pluralism and national authori-
ties following in succession” (Mielczarek, 2007, p. 42). Nevertheless, as the
author of this article claims “the future would show how far practise failed
to meet legislators’ expectations” (Szynol, 2011, p. 216).
During the first license process only one TV station was given a permit
for nationwide terrestrial broadcasting (Polsat) and one for regional (TV
Wis³a). The latter played an important role in developing a second nation-
wide television, which came into existence in 1997, during the second li-
cense process, namely TVN. And that was a very significant impulse to
sharpen competition on the countrywide level (even despite the fact that
the license for TVN was not nationwide). As Z. Bajka summarizes “Since
October 1993 up to the end of February 1998 the NBC granted altogether
212 concessions, including 194 for radio broadcasting and 18 for televi-
sion” (Bajka, 2000, p. 96).
Unfortunately, the local level of terrestrial television in Poland neither
became powerful nor developed to visibly influence the market. There are
few reasonable explanations for that. Firstly, the number of established
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TV stations probably never exceeded twenty. Consequently, it was barely
possible to use a scale effect by creating a network that might be finan-
cially self-sufficient (Polonia1 may serve as a model). Furthermore, un-
successful Grauso’s attempt resulted in falling the network apart. Some of
local stations were just shut down, another tried to operate independently.
Secondly, there was no support from the NBC and other regulators to run
this kind of business, which is quite expensive. To cover all these expenses
connected with infrastructure, equipment and trained staff without any
subsidies or tax exemptions the advertisements market would have to be
much more abundant, which is not the case of Poland, especially at the lo-
cal level. Thirdly, short history of self-government authority and com-
munes casts a shadow on local society’s activity, also connected with
media. As a consequence local media are not very popular. In addition,
when it comes to TV audience ratings show that the most desirable part of
viewers (16–49 years old) are at this level almost marginal. There is no
need to explain how this effects media businesses operations.
Setting Polish economy on the tracks of free market attracted attention
of many foreign investors. At the beginning particularly in the press sector
as there were no limits for them. They presented a very well-thought-out
strategy. The most consistent were, as it was said previously, German
companies. Their step-by step actions began around the time when the
process of RSW de-monopolisation reached an advanced level. Obviously
foreign investors kept an eye out for an opportunity to access a new and
quite big market. At first they were sending translated versions of a few
magazines well-known in their own country. Next phase was to increase
the number of titles and copies produced still in Germany and to sell them
in Poland. Once they were convinced that Polish economy is stable and
Poles are willing to buy their products in large numbers they packed nec-
essary stuff and send it along with some management staff to run a serious
media business in Poland. Little by little the content was changing from
fully translated into produced by media workers hired on the new market.
Obviously, high concentration of foreign investments aroused plenty of
discussions and controversies. The journalists and some media observers
were even claiming that foreigners had made the press partition or that Po-
land became a German media colony.3 There is no intention to describe the
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3 See respectively: E. Wilk, Ho³d bawarski, “Polityka”, nr 40(2109), 4.10.1997,
p. 20; S. Sieradzki, Niemiecka prasa, “Wprost”, nr 43 (1091), October 2003, p. 22.
press market and share more opinions about what has happened on them,4
though it is more than advisable to make a point that there were some im-
portant similarities and differences in shaping press and electronic media
sectors.
To some extent electronic media were following development of the
press, though with a delay. Surely, the limit of 33% caused that foreign
companies were not so eager to invest their money without any prospects
of expanding shares, as it was the case in the newspapers and magazines.
Nevertheless, for international or even global broadcasters and producers
also selling their media content only, which they normally generated in
different countries, was something not to be despised. Thus, when Polish
households had become more and more equipped with satellite aerials and
connected to cable networks, those content suppliers instantly appeared on
the market. They could use for example the first scrambled TV (Canal+),
which had been given the concession during the first license process. In
the beginning foreign broadcasters did not pay a special attention to Polish
viewers as they even didn’t bother to translate the content of their channels
spread in networks and via satellite. Thus, as R Filas notices, “In the sec-
ond half of 1993 proportions between using Polish satellite channels, ac-
cessible in plenty of cable TV networks (TV Polonia, Polsat), and foreign
ones (mainly RTL, SAT1, MTV) became almost even, at the same time the
number of watching foreign TV decreased” (Filas, 1999, p. 44). As a con-
sequence, broadcasters from abroad were forced to translate the content
and in the next stage of competition – quite similarly to what had hap-
pened in the press sector – to place a part of their production in Poland.
To sum it up, foreign companies did not conquer Polish terrestrial TV
market on its opening, basically due to legal constraints. They have taken
the safe strategy. Besides one mentioned competitor, the others preferred
to sell only their ready-to-air products (or to franchise programmes),
which became much easier when in 1998 two digital platforms started
(Wizja TV and Cyfra+). Situation changed significantly in May 2004
when Poland joined European Union and limits for EU broadcasters were
abolished. Nevertheless, up to this particular moment Polish investors di-
vided the market between them and took convenient positions making the
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4 For further details see: A. Szynol, Obcy kapita³ w polskiej prasie ze szczególnym
uwzglêdnieniem dzienników regionalnych w dwadzieœcia lat po prze³omie, in: Prze-
strzenie komunikowania, eds. I. Borkowskiego, K. Stasiuk-Krajewskiej, Wroc³aw
2010, p. 81–100.
market even harder to enter. As T. Kowalski rightly discerns, “New-
comers normally arduously build up their reach and earn viewers’ accep-
tance, which causes that they are less attractive for advertisers interested
in access to mass audience. The better TV market is developed, the higher
programme offer is diversified, which raises entering barrier. Presenting
the remarkable programme offer and making it interesting for the mass
viewer usually demands extraordinary expensive and intensive marketing
efforts” (Kowalski, 2006, p. 214). Lastly, Polish TV market is dozen or so
times less attractive when it comes to advertising revenues than British,
German or French not to mention American.
Public vs. private – means biased vs. unbiased?
Another important issue which came to light vividly on the audiovisual
market was political influence. As it was said before, Polish regulatory
framework was created on the grounds of former system remnants. More-
over, even the new institutions to some extent were bound up with execu-
tive power, thus – with politicians. The most important is the National
Broadcasting Council which – according to the constitution – “stands on
guard of freedom of speech, right to information and of public radio and
television interest” (Konstytucja, 1997, rozdz. IX, art. 213, p. 1). Never-
theless, members of the NBC are nominated by political bodies and – what
may be surprising – do not need to have any degree. The only condition
taken directly from the act is “knowledge and experience in the scope of
means of social communication” (Ustawa, 1993, rozdz. II, art. 7, p. 1).
Many a times this knowledge has been checked by journalists with embar-
rassing results for politicians becoming members of the Council.
Since establishing the NBC politicians were trying to have an influ-
ence on its decisions, among which is granting concessions and filling
places in supervisory boards of public radio and television. Probably the
strongest attempts had been carried out during the sixth term of parlia-
ment (2005–2007), as it was quite stormy, highly polarised and shorten
tenure. In December 2005 soon after parliamentary election three coop-
erating parties managed to make very fast amendment to the bill and
changed the number of NBC members from 9 to 5. As a result also
boards of Polish Radio and Polish Television were replaced. Personal
changes have been done on different levels, from the newsroom staff up
to the CEO of TVP.
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There is hard evidence that during mentioned period, including
pre-election time, public media, especially Polish Television was far from un-
biased and credible. E. Nowak and R. Riedel proved in their research that in
main news programme of TVP (“Wiadomoœci”) in years 2005 and 2007 pub-
lic television was partial. Eleven out of 41 analysed news items were biased in
favour of Law and Justice (PiS) and there was no negative coverage con-
nected with this party. In the meantime, the strongest opposition, namely
Civic Platform (PO), was mentioned 4 times in the negative context but never
in the positive. Two years later the outcome of analyses was even worse. In fa-
vour of PiS researchers found 14 pieces and no negative, whereas for PO it
was 7 negative and no positive. It is more than justified to state that personal
changes which had been done between the two analyses did the trick.
Partiality, however, did not concern only public television. In the same
research Nowak and Riedel discovered by comparison that also commercial
station, namely TVN was not completely unbiased. In its main news
programme (“Fakty”) in 2005 six items were in favour of PO and two nega-
tive, whereas for PiS none was positive and one negative. Two years later
partiality increased significantly as PO earned 11 positive and nought nega-
tive coverage while PiS, on the contrary, had only 2 positive but 14 negative.
Both measurements were taken shortly before two parliamentary cam-
paigns when majority of news items were devoted to political activities.
Conclusions from the mentioned research were also shared by the Or-
ganization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Dem-
ocratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODHIR). In their final
report written after pre-term parliamentary elections (21 October 2007)
it is clearly said that “last two weeks of the campaign showed lack of
qualitative balance by public television in the coverage of the three main
contestants. The National Broadcasting Council was unable to properly
discharge its constitutional responsibility due to deficiencies in its struc-
ture and disagreements flowing from its partisan composition, underlining
the need for measures of reform to ensure appropriate independent over-
sight of the conduct of the public media” (OSCE/ODHIR, 2008, p. 1). The
authors of the report did not have many critical remarks addressed to pri-
vate TV stations. However, they noticed that both commercial broadcast-
ers paid a little bit more attention to Civic Platform than to Law and Justice
and that Polsat coverage was slightly more critical towards PiS. One of the
most important conclusions from this report was that “Consideration
should be given to minimizing governmental influence on the composi-
tion of the NBC, and to achieve greater balance, diversity and independ-
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ence in managerial appointments in public media” (OSCE/ODHIR, 2008,
p. 14). Under the ruling of quite exotic coalition (PiS–LPR–Samoobrona)
sometimes it was not the most important what has been said in the news
but was has been left unsaid. There was a couple of widely commented in-
formation in private stations that public television passed them over. Ex-
amples of such shameful behaviour and hand-controlled politics in public
media also on a regional level the author gives in another publication.5
First of May 2004 Poland entered European Union and as a conse-
quence the limit of 33 per cent shares in the electronic media sector for EU
members has been abolished. It gave a chance for foreign companies to
conquer Polish market. First steps have been taken in radio broadcasting
segment. The second popular station in Poland, that is Radio Zet, sold its
shares in autumn 2004 to French group – Lagardère. This, however, was
not a surprise as – if truth be told – the French controlled the station before
the act came into existence. Two years later, this time by surprise, the Ger-
man group, namely Bauer, took over the biggest radio station – RMF FM.
Most employees received this news without enthusiasm; however, there
were not so many personal changes or lay-offs than someone would have
expected. As the German group possesses also different media in Poland
(mainly magazines for women and the youth) radio stations became an ef-
ficient tool for cross-media promotions.
Talking about impartiality in TV it has to be emphasized that for very
long time public television had the dominant position on the market,
which is obviously not the favourable factor. Appearance of the first pri-
vate station did not change this immediately. Moreover, commercial sta-
tion was at first very focused on gaining the widest reach and that was
possible to accomplish by broadcasting ‘easy to consume’ content. This
attitude was in due course a kind of a curse for Polsat, as the station was
commonly called disco-polo channel. Launching the second competitor,
TVN, started a new era on the television market in Poland. The target of
the new station was set differently. Polish investors, namely Walter and
Wejchert’s families, tried to address their TV to richer Poles living
mainly in big cities. TVN, which was the most important part of ITI
media group, from its beginning put emphasis on the news and commen-
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5 A. Szynol, Towards commercialistaion and politicisation – Polish media and
Polish journalism20 years after socio-political change, in: Making democracy in
20 years. Media and politics in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by B. Dobek-Ostrow-
ska, M. G³owacki, Wroc³aw 2011, p. 235–247.
tary programmes and thus became a stimulus for competition in the field
of independent, credible and efficient journalism. Nonetheless, according
to the AGB Polska data Polish Television in 2000 still had almost the half of
the audience (TVP1 – 25,7%; TVP2 – 19,1%; TVP Regional – 2,9%),
whereas Polsat one fourth (25,3%) and TVN only a bit more than one tenth
(11,4%). It is easy to count that the great four (as it is used to name: TVP1,
TVP2, Polsat, TVN) on the verge of the new millennium had 81,5% of the
whole television market. What is more, the cable and satellite TV managed
to capture only 5,3% of viewers even despite the fact that in the late nineties,
as R. Filas claims (2010, p. 35) there were about 800 cable networks spread
all over the country (or rather the number of networks than operators).
It is worth mentioning that there was one attempt to come into being on
the terrestrial TV market. In March 2001 on the remnants of Franciscan
TV Niepokalanów, which did not succeed, TV Puls was established. Due
to religious character and limited technical reach the station was still
barely visible in ratings. Lured by easy and fast investment on the quite
cheap market, Rupert Murdoch took over 24,5% of TV Puls in June 2006.
It may be assumed that Australian media tycoon was pretty sure of that he
was going to become a big player on Polish TV market as it was the case of
Bulgaria. Thanks to his political believes and connections he managed to
change the license records from specialised to universal. Furthermore, be-
ing favoured by the biased NBC he was granted more frequencies, which
gave TV Puls wider reach (from 15,9 to 29%). In the meantime he raised
his shares up to 35%. Nevertheless, the station could not break 1% of
shares of the audience and Rupert Murdoch withdrew from Poland in No-
vember 2008. Probably he underestimated the strength of competitors and
was not ready to invest more money without quick return prospects. His
investments in Puls have been estimated at 50 million dollars, which
seems to be not enough to take up equal fight with competitors being pres-
ent on the market for dozen or so years.
To summarise the issue of impartiality and political influences, it is
worthwhile to quote last results of opinion polls, made by CBOS (³b, 2014).
The most appreciated television in Poland is public TV with 82% positive
marks (11% of increase in comparison March 2014 to March 2013). Second
position was taken by TVN with 80% (6% rises) and the third belonged to
Polsat – 79% (also 6% higher than the previous year). Only 11–12% of re-
spondents were unsatisfied with their efficiency. It appears that Poles are
quite forgiving when it comes to their attitude towards TV stations even if
impartiality of some broadcasters was more than disputable.
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Late digitalisation – last chances for cable and sat TV
The new millennium brought along many significant changes to the
market. First of all – the Internet, however, in Poland majority did not have
an access up until 2009. Nonetheless, electronic media were in the audi-
ence centre as 92% of people’s time devoted to media in 2001 was spent
on: TV (60,7%), radio (30,2%) and the Internet (1,4%) (Makarenko,
2001). Surely, during the next decade these proportions were to change in
favour of the Internet and the content available on mobile devices, though
a large amount of it was still produced by TV broadcasters. Together with
the audience expectations producers and broadcasters had to develop their
offer and make it easy to reach. As a result digital platforms were
launched. Wizja TV and Cyfra+, established in 1998, merged into Cyfra+
four years later. In the meantime (2000) Polsat started its own platform
– Cyfrowy Polsat. This kind of strategy turned out efficient and in 2006
also the closest competitor, ITI group did the same and set up digital plat-
form called television n. When the structure of ITI ownership changed
Cyfra+ and television n were merged in March 2013 into nc+.
At the beginning the growth of new platforms was not so fast, as it is
shown in table 1. In the first five years of their operations the change was
minimal. Probably the main obstacle was a poor offer and the cost of sub-
scription and other fees (satellite dish, decoder, installation). But as the
number of available channels also translated and thematic ones steadily
increased the satellite television became much more popular. Filas points
out that in four years 2003–2007 the number of subscribers tripled from
950 thousand up to 3,4 million. It happened along with a crop of new Pol-
ish-language thematic channels, such as sports which doubled, women’s,
children’s and music (Filas, 2010, p. 46–47).
Table 1
Number of digital platforms users [mil.]
Platform 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 2013
C. Polsat 0,8–1,0 0,2 0,3 0,5 1,0 >2,0 3,2 3,506 3,6
Cyfra+ 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,9 >1,0 1,4 1,550 2,8
n – – – 0,06 >0,2 0,7 1,275
Ó 0,8–1,0 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,96 3,3 5,3 6,331 6,4
In some cases the figures given in different documents are slightly different. ‘Ó’ means total, ‘>’
a little bit more than the figure.
Source: Own combination based on the NBC and broadcasters’ reports.
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Terrestrial broadcasters, especially commercial groups, were very ac-
tive in setting up thematic channels for a couple of reasons. Firstly, they
could more precisely reach different targets and audience group of inter-
ests (e.g. TVN24 – successfully introduced in August 2001 informational
television). Secondly, having their own digital platform they could pro-
duce more content and sell it along with the air-time filled with advertise-
ments. Thirdly, fierce competition did not give them any other option than
to create as many channels and products as rivals. Lastly, prospect of
digitalisation of terrestrial signal meant that instead of a couple of nation-
wide or over/regional stations it might be possible to have more than
twenty of them. Consequently, it was necessary to show off and to prove
that the company is suitable to be given the chance on the MUX – digital
terrestrial TV platform.
Thus, strong competition between TV broadcasters was the essential
factor for fast development of digital platforms, however, no less than the
NBC announcement about switch off in July 2013. Ahuge leap may be ob-
served in 2006 (and next year) when ITI launched its own platform and
Polsat responded with a very attractive offer, especially when it comes to
prices. In October 2008 the president of the Office of Electronic Commu-
nications (UKE) announced the contest for booking frequencies that were
going to be used in DVB-T (Digital Video Broadcasting-Terrestrial) and
DVB-H (-Handheald). Once the deadline for a switch off had been set for
the end of July 2013 the broadcasters started to fight for digital platforms
viewers. Consequently, last couple years were constant attempts to outrun
rivals. The most visible manifestation of it was Christmas promotions.
The increase was significant up to the year 2011 as from this point onward
DVB-T has been successfully and gradually introducing. Slight decrease
in the second half of 2013 (200–300 thousand less than shown in table 1)
was a consequence of growing popularity and full access to DVB-T and
clumsily carried out merger between television n and Cyfra+. In media ob-
servers’opinion the debut of joined platforms may serve as a model for PR
workers how they should not act in social media.
Simultaneously with digital platforms also cable TV has been develop-
ing. On opening the market, plethora of operators appeared. In their main
focus were the big and medium sized cities as these were already equipped
with basic telecommunication infrastructure. In due course they estab-
lished necessary installations in every city above 40 thousand of citizens.
As it was mentioned previously, at the end of XX century there were about
800 cable TV networks present on the Polish market and this was going to
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change in a couple of years ahead as well as the fact that at the turn of the
centuries satellite and cable TV were able to capture only each twentieth
viewer. In March 2001 the NBC stated in its report that cable TV in Poland
is the third biggest in Europe and the fastest when it comes to its growth.
However, process of consolidation has been started as dozen or so suppli-
ers dominated the market and 30 the biggest firms supported two third of
all users (KRRiT, 2001, p. 170). At the beginning of 2003 it was only 15
firms with the share of 78%. In 2006 the number of the biggest players
dropped to ten firms that had 3 million subscribers (about two thirds).
Finally, process of consolidation led to current situation when there are
basically three major players: UPC (1,47 mil.), Vectra (834 th.) and Multi-
media Polska (825 th.), which gives them about 68% of the market (data of
Polish Chamber of Electronic Communication, PIKE – IV quarter of
2013).
Table 2
Number of cable TV operators and users [mil.]
Year 1995 1998 2000
2001–
2008
2009 2010 2012 2013
Number of operators 300 461 600 600 450 >400 500 500
Number of subscribers 2–2,5 2,8 3,5 4,5 4,5 >4,0 4,2a 4,6–4,7
a There is a data inconsistency even inside the NBC reports. In the same document (KRRiT, 2013)
on page 35 it is mentioned 4,2 million cable TV sockets, whereas on page 14 – 5,6 million of
users. Next year in KRRiT information different data are given in the same document (KRRiT,
2014): on page 11 the number of cable TV users is 4,6 million and on 35 – 4,7 million.
Source: Own combination based on the NBC and broadcasters’ reports.
Moreover, as it is shown in table 2 the number of operators was not
strictly connected with the most important thing – number of subscribers.
It may be assumed that these figures do not cover a full picture. Number of
users was for sure bigger than subscribers or sockets. For a couple of years
operators probably did not count multiroom services as an additional con-
sumer activity, which distorted the statistics. Another thing is that even
without a significant increase of subscribers it was possible for the suppli-
ers to earn more money. Within the last few years they enriched the offer
essentially, thus also ARPU (average revenue per user) could vary. In the
middle of previous decade cable TV operators spread about 400 channels
among which there were 50 in Polish language. As the NBC reports show,
in 2010 this number tripled up to 146 channels (worth emphasizing that
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81 of which licensed abroad). Furthermore, operators added to their offer
other services, such us the Internet and telephone or all of them in the triple
play package.
To sum it up, satellite and cable TV came long way from the margin of
the market up to significant players making use of late digitalisation
of Polish television. As the NBC information states, in 2010 most of
West-European countries were far ahead of Poland when it comes to the
type of dominant TV signal (digital vs. analogue). In Spain, Great Britain
and France digitalisation exceeded 90 per cent (respectively: 98, 97 and
93%), whereas in Poland it was only 56% (KRRiT, 2012, p. 55). It ex-
plains why satellite and cable TV gained such a strong position before
Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) became accessible and popular. They
managed to enrich their offer and make it useful for many viewers. Turn-
ing this process away will not be easy task to perform and will last another
few years.
One-way ticket – digitalisation
It seems to be quite obvious that the change into digital is something ir-
reversible. Moreover, it is not only the matter of terrestrial television. As it
was said above, satellite and cable TV made good use of delaying switch
off and in the last few years earned viewers’ attention, which was also
profitable. As the graph 1 shows within three years 2010–2012 the number
of viewers watching TV via satellite increased significantly. Cable TV
won more customers in 2011 but next year the number dropped. Aggres-
sive marketing strategy of operators and audiovisual content producers
caused that number of free-to-air TV viewers decreased in the whole ob-
served period.
On the graph 2 it is quite clearly shown that satellite TV highly likely
soared at cable TV expense in 2012 and even more at terrestrial TV ex-
pense in years 2011–2012. When the latter was losing its shares on the
market (2,2% in 2011 in comparison to 2010 and 1,3% in 2012 to 2011)
satellite grew up sharply (respectively 1,3 and 3,6%). The only thing
which might be surprising is the fact that in spite of almost the same per-
centage share of the satellite and cable TV audience (especially in 2011)
the number of satellite viewers was much higher (by 3,5 million). The best
explanation seems to be that for a long time sharing the signal taken from
satellite dish was impossible whereas it was not the case of cable network,
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easily spreadable. In a different survey (KRRiT, 2012, p. 11) the outcome
for the satellite TV in 2011 was even higher – 43,9%, whereas cable TV
reached 29,2% and terrestrial television 26,9% (18,7 – analogue and
8,2 – digital). This fluctuation and discrepancies are quite understandable,
as these were only estimations and what is more, done in the period of
fierce competition between broadcasters and mixture of possible way of
signal reception.
In April 2010 the ministry of infrastructure and development an-
nounced the deadline for switching off the analogue signal – 31 July of
2013. Nevertheless, the process of digitalisation had already begun. Cable
TV operators did not wait for this moment but had been enriching their of-
fer in the meantime. The change of proportions between channels in ana-
logue and digital version has been gradually but consistently made. The

















Graph 1. Number of viewers accoridng to the way of reception
Source: Own combination based on the Nielsen Audience Measurement data taken from (Koziel-
ski, Gluza, 2013).
same concerned satellite channels, however, in a slightly different mode.
To improve the offer satellite platforms replaced the old equipment with
the new one and thus were able to spread the content in high definition
standard. Simultaneously, operators were encouraging producers to gen-
erate the content in HD version. Also the channels made by the owners of
platforms have been transformed into this higher quality.
The project of Digital Terrestrial Television in Poland assumed setting
up three multiplexes (MUX 1, MUX 2 and MUX 3), that are multi-
functional platforms which can spread the package of digital radio and TV
signal along with additional data (such as EPG – Electronic Programme
Guide) in one frequency channel. It was presumed that each MUX could
consist of seven or eight channels. There is no intention to describe step
by step every change on the MUX-es content, though the process was
quite complicated and included several in-between movements. Gen-
erally, MUX 1 was planned as a temporary platform for main public TV
channels. As soon as the third platform was ready all Polish Television




















Graph 2. The way of TV reception [%]
Source: Own combination based on the Nielsen Audience Measurement data taken from
(KRRiT, 2014, p. 5).
channels would go to MUX 3 and new broadcasters (and also latecomers)
could replace TVP on MUX 1. The second platform was planned for pri-
vate nationwide channels already existed on the terrestrial TV market
(Polsat, TVN, Puls, TV 4). In Septmber 2010 MUX 2 was launched in
a couple of regions and the same happened with MUX3 a month later.
Next year also MUX1 began to partially operate. The process of spreading
each platform’s technical reach was surprisingly smooth and even shut-
ting down the analogue signals in particular regions where digitalisation
had been carried out did not encounter serious difficulties. The final
switch off was accomplished the 23rd of July 2013.
Kozielski and Gluza rightly noticed (2013, p. 6) that “Digitalisation
phenomenon is done, though the fragmentation phenomenon is under its
way – none of broadcasters will give up the fight on a viewer.” Thus, as it
was mentioned previously, all of the competitors were trying to run their
businesses effectively and moreover to create new channels. This way
Polsat launched thematic channel – Polsat Sport News which in due
course was placed on MUX 2. By the same token Polskie Media (the
owner of TV 4) established TV 6, ITI group TTV and Polish Television
made use of this historical opportunity and divided its informational chan-
nel into TVP Info and TVP Regionalna. It is worth emphasizing that enor-
mous activity of broadcasters and multimedia companies influenced
severely the position of so-called great four. Comparing their shares in
May 2013 and 2012 they lost almost 9% (from 57,66 to 48,88 – NAM
data). It may be said that their era of TV dictatorship has ended. However,
paradoxically thanks to DTT technical reach of TVN increased up to
97,6% which had never happened before.
In the table 3 the latest composition of MUX-es has been compiled.
The biggest share in DTT fell to Polish Television with eight channels.
Furthermore, up to 27 of April TVP 1 will be kept on MUX 1 and then re-
placed by Fokus TV. Thus, public TV may be called as a big winner of
digitalisation. However, time will show whether all thematic channels of
TVP become as popular as competitors’ proposals. Other broadcasters be-
ing present on the terrestrial TV market also should not complaint. Polsat
placed its sport channel and moreover as Polskie Media company belongs
to Solorz-¯ak the whole group managed to take additional two positions
on MUX 2 (TV 4 and TV 6). Holding ITI has three channels on
multiplexes. The main product, namely TVN, and secondary TVN 7 on
MUX 2 and the third one, called TTV, on MUX 1, however in this televi-
sion the group holds only majority shares. Dariusz D¹bski, the owner of
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TV Puls, was granted a place for his second channel, which is Puls 2. Nev-
ertheless, there are some doubts if Polish businessman is resourceful
enough to compete with bigger players on the market. As Kozielski and
Gluza point out “A viewer tempted with the novelty of multiplex will zap
to a new channel. But once he finds more and more reruns he may go back
to those watched previously” (Kozielski, Gluza, 2013, p. 9).
Table 3
Current composition of MUX-es
MUX 1 MUX 2 MUX 3
TVP 1  Fokus TV Polsat TVP 1 HD
TVP ABC TVN TVP 2 HD
Eska TV TVN 7 TVP Info
TTV TV 4 TVP Kultura
Polo TV TV Puls TVP Polonia
ATM Rozrywka Puls 2 TVP Historia
TV Trwam TV 6 TVP Rozrywka
Stopklatka TV Polsat Sport News TVP Regionalna
Source: Own combination based on data taken from Emitel’s webpage (MUX-es technical opera-
tor), 25.05.2014.
On this stake there are also debutants, though some of them well-known
from different segments of media landscape. The most successful seems to
be Zbigniew Benbenek, founder of Zjednoczone Przedsiêbiorstwa Roz-
rywkowe, and the co-owner or shareholder of: the biggest radio network
(Eska), Eska TV, Polo TV, Fokus TV, daily tabloid “Super Express” and
even the network of casinos. As he believes in being far from media hype
sometimes is called the éminence grise. Enthusiastic reception of his TV
channels, packed with popular entertainment and disco music ensures fast
returns of investments. Another newcomer is ATM group – TV content
producer. Its reality shows, sitcoms, serials and quiz shows are very
well-known and it is highly likely that some of them will be broadcasted in
ATM Rozrywka channel.
It is worth mentioning a few statements about latecomers. In Decem-
ber 2012 the NBC announced a contest for four left places on MUX 1.
Conditions were quite strict as each channel had to fit to one of the catego-
ries: educational-cognitive, children’s, movies and socio-religious. The
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least might be said about the winner of the first category as Fokus TV will
appear at the end of April 2014, however, in their application the main
content consists of: documentary, educational and guidance programmes.
Polish Television won in the children’s channel and thus TVP ABC
started. First ratings are quite promising as in March 2014 ABC was
a leader of kids’ channels. Furthermore, public TV has vast archives that
can be useful also in the case of ABC and other thematic channels.
Stopklatka is the winner in the field of movie channel, which was not sur-
prising as the founders are Kino Polska and Agora. The latter is a very
powerful concern and among other things publisher of “Gazeta Wy-
borcza”. Majority shares belong to Kino Polska, a company which is
over ten years on the media market in Poland and had during the contest
support from famous directors, such us: Agnieszka Holland, Roman
Polañski and Andrzej Wajda. This kind of back up and two companies’
cooperation was very convincing for the NBC and hopefully also for the
viewers.
The history of granting TV Trwam a place on multiplex may serve as
a case for separate study. Nevertheless, it has to be said a few words about
this station. Its founder, father Tadeusz Rydzyk, is undoubtedly the most
controversial priest in Poland. Although in the documents the license is
given to Lux Veritatis Foundation, everyone easily associate Trwam (and
also Radio Maryja) with the extrovert priest. It was him and his strong
conservative views that endeared him hundreds of thousands Poles march-
ing in supporting protests against the NBC decision after the first contest,
when TV Trwam did not receive a place on MUX. Consequently, during
the additional contest, under such pressure and conditions of this license
distribution no one would dare to pass Rydzyk over.
Fragmentation of TV market in Poland is a fact and clearly shown in
table 4. Only great four can still reach more than 10% of the whole audi-
ence (4+). Public broadcaster as the heir of old times is a little bit privi-
leged when it comes to the general audience but in commercial group
(16–49) both public TV programmes lose significantly with private com-
petitors. The distance between great four and other rivals is shrinking and
this may be observed as a constant trend. Moreover, during the last year
besides TV Puls (+ 0,1%) all the rest stations decreased. In first 10 the
most popular TV stations there is almost every channel that is present on
one of the MUX-es. In the audience 4+ only news channel, namely
TVN24, and Polsat2 are not placed on any MUX. In the target group there
is one more channel absent on DTT – TVP Seriale.
60 Adam Szynol SP 2 ’14
Table 4
Viewership of the most popular channels in first quarter of 2014 [%]
Channel Shares 4+ Shares 16–49 Channel
1 TVP1 14,07 13,20 Polsat 1
2 TVN 11,87 13,05 TVN 2
3 Polsat 11,66 10,46 TVP1 3
4 TVP2 10,39 8,92 TVP2 4
5 TVN7 3,35 3,36 TV PULS 5
6 TV PULS 3,01 3,26 TVN7 6
7 TVN24 2,90 2,54 TV4 7
8 TVP INFO 2,60 2,37 TVN24 8
9 TV4 2,58 1,57 TVP Seriale 9
10 Polsat2 1,61 1,56 Polsat2 10
Source: Own combination based on the Nielsen Audience Measurement data taken from (Kur-
dupski, 2014).
What has to be bear in mind, experienced players were kept fighting
for as many places on DTT as it was possible. Moreover, their efforts be-
gan earlier on different submarkets, such as cable and satellite TV. Sum-
marised ratings of the three most powerful TV groups prove that vividly.
According to NAM data (pp, 2014) in January 2013 TVP group had
31,93% shares (31,32 in 2012). Polsat group reached 22,27% (22,48)
and TVN group 20,13% (20,64). Thus, even though they lost the power
in single products they managed to sustain their market positions in
whole.
The process of digitalisation is only partially finished and completed as
there is still a place for other multiplexes (up to 8). Three years ago the
NBC was planning to establish two more MUX-es for following broad-
casters and another one for mobile TV (DVB-H), however, already ended
proceedings show that there is no certainty whether it will come into exis-
tence. Although one should pay more attention to the regional or local
multiplexes. As it was emphasized, terrestrial television on the lowest
level had never been a strong submarket. Nevertheless, it may be a chance
to restore this important segment in the era of glocal media and fragmenta-
tion. On the verge of switch off some of the local stations were shut down,
e.g. Telewizja Dolnoœl¹ska (part of Odra TV). On the other hand, in De-
cember 2013 two local multiplexes were launched (with local station TVT
in Rybnik and the second one with NTL Radomsko). In both cases local
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broadcasters cooperate along with 4Fun Media. It is more than advisable
that the NBC should take care of such initiatives.
Conclusions
Polish independent media history is relatively short and when it comes
to electronic sector it goes back to early nineties. Breakthrough point for
television was launching the second private station, which significantly
speeded up the competition. Due to the foreign investors’ legal restrictions,
Polish market has been protected for over decade. This period was fruitfully
used by family-run companies which quite fast divided the market between
them. Zygmunt Solorz-¯ak, who is claimed to be one of the richest Pole
(with over 10 bil. z³otych), built up the solid foundations for his multimedia
business with nationwide television, digital platform and telecom. Euro-
pean circumstances gave him a chance to make use of internationalisation
of his assets, which is probably much more efficient than running all the en-
terprises in Poland. The second group (ITI) was founded by two families
whose members had vision of very modern media holding. In Polish reality
it appeared that some investments were too expensive and in the long-run
it was impossible to cope without international financial support. Jan
Wejchert’s death and Mariusz Walter’s withdrawal from active managing
the holding along with debts caused gradual sell out of the company, lately
co-owned by Swiss businessman Bruno Valsangiacomo. These changes
probably resulted also in great merger of two satellite platforms.
Digitalisation has been carried out with a considerable delay and the
market, especially satellite and cable TV operators, had plenty of time to
prepare for it. It led to fierce competition between them, which seemed to be
advantageous for viewers who have been given a lot of new possibilities:
enriched offers, triple play services, visibly improved quality of the content
etc. However, late digitalisation and former division of the TV market
caused that none of foreign players appeared on DTT sector. Fragmentation
of TV signal reception, brought along with digitalisation, seemingly weak-
ened the main competitors’ channels, nevertheless, taking into account the
new products – their market positions are rather unthreatened. Decisions
made by the NBC during the MUX-es creation let that happen. Further-
more, newcomers on TV market are quite familiar to the audience and me-
dia researchers and neither of them expects revolution. It may happen that
sharing multiplexes this way was a kind of lost chance for starting it.
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Huge investments made by media companies (one year of broadcast-
ing on MUX costs about 10 million z³otych) resulted in advertisements
brokers’consolidation. One of them, namely Atmedia, almost disappeared
from the market. Main players try to cope with adverts’ management by
themselves to avoid additional costs. Another thing is how to share the
content in new devices springing up like mushrooms. Asbis company esti-
mates that in 2014 the number of tablets in Poland will double and broad-
casters have to take it into consideration. As well as new phenomena, such
as meshing and stacking. According to Millword Brown survey (km,
2014), watching TV is accompanied by using a second device with
a screen. In Poland 18% of the time is devoted to the content related to
what we are watching on TV (meshing), however, no less than 22% of the
time we spend on the second screen displaying something non-related
(stacking). For broadcasters this is something quite new and they will have
to respond to this customers’ behaviour as they try to avoid zapping and
zipping, nonetheless to little effect.
The future of de-fragmented viewers’ attention is hard to predict. It
seems that media companies are making unceasing efforts to capture cus-
tomers on every single tap/click on their electronic devices, no matter
whether it is a TV screen, laptop, smartphone or tablet. And this is a real
dimension of digitalisation. What we are living now is not the same ana-
logue world where almost everything was put in order, in so to speak linear
perspective. It is barely possible that we could and wish turn this way
back. Digitalisation is a one-way ticket.
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Cyfryzacja polskiej telewizji – mo¿liwoœæ rozwoju czy stracone szanse
Streszczenie
G³ównym tematem artyku³u jest cyfryzacja i jej wp³yw na telewizjê w Polsce. Au-
tor szeroko opisuje podstawy tego procesu, próbuj¹c dokonaæ porównania miêdzy
drog¹ rozwoju mediów drukowanych i elektronicznych. Siêgaj¹c do prze³omowego
okresu, analizuje kluczowe wydarzenia i to, jakie piêtno odcisnê³y na elektronicznym
segmencie systemu medialnego w Polsce. Najsilniejszy akcent w artykule jest po-
³o¿ony na wy³¹czeniu analogowego sygna³u nadawania telewizji naziemnej: jak do
tego dosz³o i jakie by³y/s¹ konsekwencje tego fenomenu. Autor wspiera omawiane
zjawiska najwa¿niejszymi danymi i niezbêdnymi objaœnieniami tego, co wydarzy³o
siê na rynku audiowizualnym.
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